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What Happened To Big Law?

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The news was shocking: On Oct 28, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, a nearly century-old law firm, announced that it is dissolving its partnership and winding down operations. 

This was no bush-league operation. Weil had 16 offices, hundreds of associates, and over $2 billion in yearly revenue, making it among the most profitable firms in the world. It made its hay advising big companies—Lehman Brothers, GM—on their bankruptcies. Now it was Weil’s turn to face insolvency. 

While the announcement may have felt stunning, the crumbling of this storied firm was no bolt in the blue. In truth, it was just the latest indication of how dramatically the legal field has been remade over the past few decades. 

Big Law—the coterie of corporate firms with offices in dozens of cities and earnings in the billions—looks very different these days. The firms are no longer venerable and stable partnerships advising a stable of long-standing clients. Instead, they have become volatile, top-heavy, transaction based, and precarious collections of professionals with only loose ties to their firms. And unlike the large banks that they increasingly resemble, they have no capital of their own—just human capital, which they treat as temporary and fungible. Until it isn't, and the whole thing comes crashing down. 

Gone are the wood-paneled libraries and clubby partnerships of popular perception. Today’s Big Law is more akin to the modern NFL or MLB: firms boast a few big stars whose loyalties extend no further than their next massive contract, supported by an army of freshly-drafted backups content to make the league minimum. And just like in pro sports, if a star player leaves, the fortunes of the whole team can crater.


America’s elite bar didn’t always look this way. In the 1950s and 1960s, so-called “white shoe” firms, named for the style of footwear popular among mid-century Ivy League grads, were steadfast advisors to the nation’s largest corporations and investment banks. Millbank was known for representing the Rockefellers. Davis Polk oversaw almost all of Morgan Stanley’s transactions. Up to 95 percent of top firms’ client lists remained steady year after year. 

Since the early 1900s, Big Law had operated under what was known as the Cravath System, which derived its name from the white-shoe firm that pioneered it. Partners were never poached from outside; they were promoted from within. New associates started in the farm system. During a probationary period of roughly seven years, they enjoyed tutelage from senior partners, marinated in the firm’s culture, and proved their mettle. Compensation was tightly equalized. All associates hired in a given year were paid in lockstep. Partners, each of whom had contributed an equity stake in the firm, split profits evenly. 

Firms might have been big businesses, but they weren’t run like a corporation. They left daily operations and firm governance up to the partners—the “player-coaches” of an earlier age of pro sports. There were no PR flaks, no mid-level bureaucrats, no “business development” department. Partners’ sense of noblesse oblige meant that efforts to maximize profits were seen as a bit disreputable, a touch unseemly. 

Before the 1970s, lawyers even felt uneasy about billing by the hour: wouldn’t that just reduce their labor to an interchangeable commodity, with no respect for quality or experience? Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist certainly thought so. In a 1996 commencement address, he lamented the tyranny of the billable hour. Now, he said, there was no “great difference between the law firm” and “the office supply vendor who simply counts the number of pencils furnished and sends a bill for that amount.” 

The situation may have not been optimally competitive. And it frankly excluded people—women, white ethnics, racial minorities—who lacked the “breeding” to fit into this gentlemanly realm, dominated as it was by WASP male Ivy graduates. But if you made it in the door, this arrangement had its upsides. Since associate hiring was slow and lateral moves unheard of, both partners and associates had a strong sense of loyalty. Salaries were high, but never astronomical, since firms weren’t competing to lure rainmakers from outside. 

This stately status quo wouldn’t survive the changes that would rock the profession—and the entire American economy—in the go-go years to come.


In the 1980s, law began its many-decades march towards an era of free agency. Instability and casualization bled over from Wall Street. As financial transactions surged in that frenzied decade, Big Law became more market driven, more entrepreneurial—just like the banks and buyout firms it represented. Client relationships became more short-term, as firms jockeyed with each other to get hired by in-house legal departments on a transaction-by-transaction basis. New entrants—scrappy, mostly Jewish law firms like Skadden Arps and, yes, Weil Gotshal—elbowed into the fray by becoming experts in the mergers and bankruptcy work that was exploding in the era of corporate takeovers, but the WASP firms still found too debased to touch. 

To handle this flood of business, firms hired rafts of new associates fresh from law school. But rather than treating them like valued employees who might enjoy a long tenure with the firm, partners thought of them as widgets—workers who could be profitably plugged into the broadening base of their employment pyramid. By the late 1980s, firms that had previously employed one or two associates under each partner now had over four per partner. While the pay was good, the hours weren’t: Associates spent 70, 80, or even 90 hours in the office each week. 

Unsurprisingly, most associates didn't last long. By the early 1990s, over 80 percent of associates washed out before their fifth year, a rate not dissimilar to the length of the average pro football career. Firms replaced them with draftees from next years’ class of law school graduates—which, not incidentally, were more diverse than the WASP men who came before. Just as Big Law finally began to admit women and people of color, entry-level work became much more precarious. Jim Freund, one of Skadden’s leading M&A partners, admitted as much in a speech at a firm-wide gathering. “Don’t let yourself be deluded into believing you’re indispensable,” he told the roomful of lawyers. “You may be missed, but you can be replaced . . . without a single ripple in the water.”

In the 1980s and especially the 1990s, that cavalier attitude crept into how firms treated their traditional equity partners, too. First, firms stopped compensating all partners equally, rewarding them instead based on the revenue they brought in—the “eat-what-you-kill” model. Then, firms created a new tier of not-quite-partners, who neither contributed equity to the firm nor enjoyed a cut of profits or a say in firm decision-making. These “non-equity partners” were essentially glorified associates with a fancy title and a pay bump. And by 2025, they outnumbered the total number of equity partners nationally. Equality—the very foundation of any professional partnership—had been abandoned.  

What’s more, partners began outsourcing firm governance and business processes to a raft of non-lawyer managers. In 1980, Skadden Arps was the first New York firm to bring in an executive with an MBA and CPA—but notably, no JD—as managing director. He tightened up their timekeeping practices, ensuring that associates were approaching “100 percent utilization”—a figure based on an imaginary attorney who took no sick days, time off, or lunch breaks. Over the next decade, nearly every Big Law firm followed suit. By 1991, a study by the American Bar Association found that law firm management no longer resembled an “enlightened corporate executive or professional,” but “rather the industrial manager in the earlier years of the Industrial Revolution.”

I know this story personally. My first job out of college was working in “media relations” at a global law firm. I was just one out of scores of non-lawyer support staff, sequestered in cubicles on a separate floor of a Midtown office tower. If there was anything gentlemanly going on at our firm, we sure couldn’t see it. 


The biggest change to rock Big Law had nothing to do with associates or office staff. It was the rise of lateral hiring—a free-agent market where star rainmakers took their client list from team to team in search of the biggest payday. 

Indeed, by the 2000s, law firms had become just another business, with a dogged emphasis on growth and a mercenary attitude towards talent. Want to build a new bankruptcy practice from scratch? Acquire an entire team—over 20 partners—from another firm, and watch that rival quickly shutter after 150 years in business. Want to expand abroad? Merge with a foreign firm and take on its attorneys and their clients. Need to bulk up your balance sheet for an expansion? Create a notionally-independent “management services organization”—an entity that allows you to take funding from private equity backers. 

In the high-stakes battle to grow revenue, firms now pay eye-popping sums to land big-name lateral hires. $20 million salaries have become almost routine. “The rules are just flying out the window,” said legal recruiter Naomi Kaplan, of the market for rainmaker partners. In 2026 alone, a record 1500-plus partners have moved between top firms, an increase of nearly 60 percent from just five years ago. With a handful of highly-paid sluggers lording over an army of utility players, firms like Paul, Weiss and Latham & Watkins are just as star-driven as your favorite baseball team. Move over Los Angeles Dodgers: here comes Cravath. 


There is a flip side to free agency. What happens to firms that lose their biggest players? They take their clients—and often, a large percentage of revenues—with them. Other partners worry that they may lose their equity stake if they don’t get out before things snowball. With the departure of just a few key partners, firms can quickly enter a terminal decline. “These firms are just people,” a senior lawyer recently told the Financial Times.  “It’s not like there are hard assets or other widgets or intellectual property. They can be pretty fragile.” 

That’s exactly what happened at Weil. The downward spiral resembled a bank run—or, if you like, the Florida Marlins selling off all their top performers just after winning the 1997 World Series. As the firm struggled to settle on a leadership team, partners looked to the exits. This summer, private equity gurus Christopher Machera and Brian Parness went to other firms. Then Weil lost its cleanup hitter: Michael Aiello and his team of M&A partners left the firm, taking their $100-$150 million dollars in yearly billings with them. 

Weil’s unraveling reminds us that just like so much in our society, Big Law increasingly operates according to the ruthless logic that structures every part of American life, from Wall Street to pro sports. 

Whatever mutual loyalties that tied workers to their employers in mid-century have evaporated. Even the highest paid and best credentialed find themselves on a knife’s edge, as bosses treat them more like replaceable serfs than as valued members of the team. 

AI will surely deepen their precarity. But it can only do so because it arrives on the heels of a half-century of devaluing work in favor of short-term profits. In the age of free agency, all of us—from pro athletes to top lawyers—are increasingly desperate just to stay in the game.

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